We use data from a large-scale and nationally representative survey from the UK to investigate the association between social mobility and cultural omnivorousness. By applying diagonal reference models to our data, we show that both parents' and respondent's educational level affect visual arts consumption, with the weight of the former being about a third in magnitude as the latter. This is inconsistent with Bourdieu's view that habitus is largely determined by primary socialisation at parental home. We also show that there is no difference in the relative weights of origin and destination between the upwardly mobile and the downwardly mobile. Finally, upwardly mobile individuals are less omnivorous than those who are intergenerationally stable in higher educational levels. These results challenge various views which attribute the emergence of cultural omnivores in contemporary society to social mobility.
more likely than others to consume high-brow culture, they do not have any general aversion against other cultural forms. Indeed, consumers of highbrow culture are just as likely to consume middle-brow or popular culture, leading Peterson and Simkus (1992) to describe them as cultural omnivores rather than cultural snobs (see also Peterson and Kern, 1996; Van Eijck, 2001; López-Sintas and García-Álvarez, 2002; Bunting et al., 2008; Bennett et al., 2009; Chan, 2010) .
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But where do cultural omnivores come from? Broadly speaking, there are two complementary views, which we label as the cultural democratisation argument and the social mobility argument respectively. The first view says that the emergence of cultural omnivores reflects a general democratisation of culture which, in turn, can be traced to a range of long-term social structural, cultural and institutional changes. On social structural change, Peterson and Kern (1996, p. 905) argue that with growing affluence, rising educational level, broader curriculum, and the gradual fusion of the arts and the media, high-brow culture has become more accessible and, correspondingly, less of a status marker. Simiarly, Van Eijck (1999, p. 310 ) discusses how advertisers use arts to market commerical products, and art institutions employ marketing techniques in order to reach larger audiences. Thus, 'mass culture, commerce, and the arts have become more and more intertwined, resulting in a blurring of the boundaries between these domains. ' On cultural trends, Peterson and Kern (1996, p. 905) argue that in the aftermath of the Second World War, and as a direct consequence of the horror of Nazism, overt discrimination and prejudice based on race, religion, etc. have become untenable. This can be seen as part of a broader cultural trend towards greater tolerance of other cultures (Inglehart, 1990) . Historians have also documented a long-term decline in deference (Runciman, 1997, pp. 153-158) . Supercilious attitudes, or at least their public expression, have become less acceptable (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2004) .
Furthermore, the art-world itself has changed. In the past, royal academies of arts defended the particular aesthetic standard that they endorsed. But the 'market forces that swept through all the arts brought in their wake new aestheic entrepreneurs who propounded . . . new and ever more exotic modes of expression' (Peterson and Kern, 1996, p. 905) . Whatever merits these competing aesthetic claims might have individually, their joint impact is to undermine the idea that there is a single artistic standard. In this way, institutional changes in the art-world also promote a more inclusive, omnivorous attitude (see also Peterson, 1992) .
The various strands of the cultural democratisation argument sketched above all suggest that cultural boundaries are weakening. In contrast, although the social mobility argument does not preclude the blurring of cultural categories, it does not require it either. Instead, it is premised on individuals crossing (possibly fixed) cultural boundaries. One version of the social mobility argument goes as follows. Socially mobile individuals were brought up in the cultural milieu of their family of origin. But, as adults, they move in quite different social and cultural circles. Because of their diverse cultural exposure, mobile individuals are more likely to be culturally omnivorous than those who are intergenerationally stable in their social positions. And since there has been substantial social mobility, in the absolute sense and mainly upward in direction, in all industrial societies over much of the twentieth century (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992) , this could explain the emergence of cultural omnivores in the past few decades.
It should be clear that the cultural democratisation argument and the social mobility argument are not mutually exclusive. Both could be true. In this paper, we focus on the latter, partly because the social mobility argument is better-defined and thus more directly testable. More importantly, the social mobility argument is widely accepted by scholars in the field. But, as we will demonstrate below, this view is not supported by empirical evidence.
Three versions of the social mobility argument
Both Peterson and Kern (1996) and Van Eijck (1999) regard social mobility as an important contributing factor to the emergence of cultural omnivores. Similarly, Lahire (2008, p. 174) maintains that 'individual mobility . . . often translate[s] into a heterogeneity of cultural practices and preferences.' And in a study of tastes in comedy, Friedman (2012, p. 467 ) 'find[s] omnivorousness only within one social group-the upwardly mobile. ' Although many scholars are in agreement that social mobility contributes to cultural omnivorousness (see also Ultee and de Graaf, 1991; Roose, 2013a,b, 2014) , closer inspection reveals three different versions of the social mobility argument. The first refers to a composition effect. This suggests that social mobility changes the composition of high status groups, but not the consumption behaviour of high status individuals. As Van Eijck (1999, p. 311) suggests, 'the higher educated has become more heterogeneous because its members are recruited from increasingly diverse social backgrounds . . . high-status groups may be composed of increasingly different people rather than increasingly omnivorous people' (emphasis in the original). If this is true, the nouveau riche would still consume low-brow culture only, while the 'old money' would remain high-brow snobs. It is only when they are viewed as a group that high status people are culturally omnivorous. Van Eijck (1999) himself is not committed to this argument which, as he points out, is directly testable with individual-level data. In particular, this view implies that the social origin of individuals completely determines their cultural consumption pattern, with destination playing little or no role.
Alternatively, the experience of social mobility might actually change the taste and behaviour of individuals. In his study of comedy tastes, Friedman (2012, p. 467) posits that 'lowbrow comedy taste is established during childhood but highbrow tastes are added as cultural capital grows.' In other words, social mobility leads to cultural omnivorousness because mobile individuals are exposed to more diverse cultural milieus. This is perhaps what most scholars have in mind when they speak of social mobility effects on cultural consumption. This view implies that both origin and destination play a non-negligible role in shaping cultural consumption. But, crucially, because it is diverse exposure that leads to cultural omnivorousness, it also implies that upwardly mobile individuals are more omnivorous than those who are immobile in high status positions. For example, first-generation university graduates should be more omnivorous than second-generation graduates.
As regards the third version of the social mobility argument, consider this early statement of Duncan (1966, p. 91 ): 'one is not entitled to discuss "effects" of mobility . . . until he has established that the apparent effect cannot be due merely to a simple combination of effects of the variables used to define mobility.' In Duncan's view, then, to speak of social mobility effects, we need to establish not only the main effects of origin and destination, but also their interaction effect (i.e. particular combinations of origin and destination) on the outcome of interest.
2 An example of such interaction effect, regarding the class-vote association in the UK, concerns a possible asymmetry between upward and downward mobility. Clifford and Heath (1993, p. 51) argue that 'the downwardly mobile . . . retain the values and behaviour patterns of their class of origin, whereas the upwardly mobile are assimilated . . . into the social networks and culture of their class of destination.' In other words, social origin is more salient for the downwardly mobile than for the upwardly mobile. But the result is that mobile individuals, whether they move upwards or downwards, are likely to vote Conservative. This is analogous to the 'status maximisation' hypothesis of Roose (2013a,b, 2014) in which socially mobile individuals behave as the immobiles in either their origin or destination category, whichever is higher. We refer to this as the asymmetry argument. In Section 3 below we will explain how these three versions of the social mobility argument are empirically tested.
Data and measures
The data we use come from a new household panel survey in the UK called Understanding Society. It was launched in 2009 and, at the time of writing, four waves of data are available for analysis.
3 Understanding Society is still a young panel survey. But it is well suited to addressing our research question, firstly, because it has a very large sample and, when appropriate sampling weights are applied, the data is representative of the UK population. More importantly, wave 2 of the survey contains a cultural consumption module. In this paper, we focus on visual arts consumption, mainly because the relevant questions are very similar to those used in some previous UK studies (e.g. Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007) . Following past practice, we restrict our analysis to respondents aged 20 to 64 (N = 28, 657).
Respondents were asked whether they had been to five types of visual arts events in the past 12 months. Table 1 lists the events and shows the percentages of respondents who replied 'yes'. The binary response to these indicators form a 5-way contingency table with 32 (i.e. 2 5 ) cells which we analyse with latent class models. The details of our latent class analyses can be found in the Appendix. Suffice it to say here that there are three latent classes in our preferred model. Members of the largest latent class (comprising 58% of the sample) are quite unlikely to attend visual art events, while those of the smallest latent class (13%) are avid consumers of visual arts of all kinds. There is a third latent class that is in-between the other two classes both in terms of its size (29%) and the probability of visual arts consumption. Overall, the results of our latent class analysis are very similar to those reported by Chan and Goldthorpe (2007) , and following them, we label the three latent classes (in descending order of size but ascending order of visual arts consumption) as inactives (I), paucivores (P ) and omnivores (O) respectively (see also Alderson et al., 2007) . Latent class membership is the dependent variable in the analyses below. Our main independent variables are the educational attainment of the respondents and that of their parents. 4 We define social mobility in terms of education rather than social class because education is one of the strongest determinants of cultural consumption. By contrast, social class is not a consistently significant predictor of cultural consumption once education and social status, in the classical Weberian sense, are taken into account (see e.g. Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007; Chan, 2010) . Moreover, focusing on education is in line with past research (Van Eijck, 1999; Roose, 2013a,b, 2014; Ultee and de Graaf, 1991) .
In Understanding Society, six educational levels for the respondents, but only five levels for the parents, are identified. To achieve comparability, we collapse the two educational classification schemes to three broad levels, namely, 'no qualifications', 'intermediate qualifications', and 'Bachelor's Degree or above' (see Table 2 for details).
5 Table 3 reports the distribution of respondents by their own educational level and that of their parents. It can be seen that, between the two generations, the share of university graduates has doubled from 14% to 28%, while 
Diagonal reference model and hypotheses
Our main analytical tool is the diagonal reference model which was first proposed by Sobel (1981 Sobel ( , 1985 in a study of social mobility effects on fertility. This class of models has subsequently been used to study a wide range of topics, including class-voting (Clifford and Heath, 1993) , life satisfaction (Marshall and Firth, 1999) , class identity (Sobel et al., 2004) , parenting practices ( Van der Slik et al., 2002) , intergenerational proximity (Chan and Ermisch, 2015) , and cultural consumption (Ultee and de Graaf, 1991; Roose, 2013a,b, 2014) . In this paper, our dependent variable is the trichotomous latent class membership (I, P or O), and the baseline diagonal reference model can be represented as follows:
where V is either P (paucivores) or O (omnivores); I stands for the inactives; π V rc is the probability of individuals with parental educational level r and own educational level c being a V ; w V measures the relative importance of parents' education in determining visual arts consumption, with 0 ≤ w V ≤ 1; and 1 − w V measures the relative weight of respondent's own education. In other words, under this model, the logit of someone from origin r and in destination c being a V rather than an I is constrained to be a weighted average of the corresponding logits of immobile people with educational levels r and c respectively.
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Recall that the first version of the social mobility argument (i.e. the composition effect argument) says that the cultural consumption behaviour of individuals is completely determined by their social origin. This implies that w V = 1.
Hypothesis 1: (if the composition effect argument holds) w V = 1.
If it turns out that w V is significantly different from 1, then both origin and destination influence individual behaviour. But this is not necessarily empirical support for the second version of the social mobility argument (i.e. the diverse exposure argument). In fact, if model 1 fits the data, then the diverse exposure argument cannot be valid. To see this, recall that this argument requires socially mobile individuals to be more omnivorous than those who are intergenerationally stable in advantaged positions. Now, the diagonal reference model constrains the logit of mobile individuals (say, being O rather than I) to be a weighted average of the logits of the two reference immobile groups. Because 0 ≤ w V ≤ 1, the logit of the socially mobile cannot be greater than the larger of the two reference logits; nor can it be less than the smaller of the two.
7 And since probability is a monotonically increasing function of the logit, one implication of model 1 is that socially mobile individuals cannot be more omnivorous than immobile individuals in the higher reference education category.
8 Conversely, if the diverse exposure argument is true, then model 1 would fail to fit the data. 6 We use the R 'gnm' package to fit diagonal reference models (Turner and Firth, 2011) . 7 That is, let γ rc be the logit of the rc-th cell, model 1 requires that min(γ rr , γ cc ) ≤ γ rc ≤ max(γ rr , γ cc ).
8 Past research has consistently shown that better educated people are more omnivorous. See also Hypothesis 2: (if the diverse exposure argument holds) model 1 does not fit the data.
The third version of social mobility argument requires the relative weights of origin and destination to differ between upwardly mobile and downwardly mobile individuals. This asymmetry can be parameterised as follows:
where δ V = 0 if c ≥ r (i.e. respondent is not better qualified than parents). In other words, model 3 returns two sets of weight parameters:
for upwardly mobile individuals, and w V for downwardly mobile individuals.
Hypothesis 3: (if the asymmetry argument holds) model 2 fits the data better than model 1 does. Table 4 reports the goodness of fit statistics of the diagonal reference models. The first thing to note is that, contrary to Hypothesis 2, our baseline model 1 actually fits the data very well. This is inconsistent with the diverse exposure argument. That is to say, so far as visual arts consumption is concerned, first-generation university graduates in the UK are not more omnivorous than second-generation graduates. Under model 1, w P = .238 (s.e. = .021) and w O = .275 (s.e. = .015). These estimates strongly suggest that both w P and w O are significantly different from one.
Results
9 Thus, we also reject Hypothesis 1 and the composition 9 The 95% confidence interval of w P is (.196, .280 ) and that of w O is (.245, .305). Another way to test Hypothesis 1 is to note that if w V = 1 model 1 reduces to log π effect argument. Bourdieu and Passeron (1973, p. 79) argue that 'the action of the educational system can attain full effectiveness only to the extent that it bears upon individuals who have been previously granted a certain familiarity with the world of art by their family upbringing.' This means that the cultural tastes and consumption patterns of individuals are largely determined by their family of origin. Once primary socialisation at parental home has done its work, secondary socialisation in school (and beyond) is relatively ineffective in shaping the habitus of individuals. Contrary to this view, we show that, for both the O v I and the P v I contrasts, the relative weight of parents' education to respondent's education is about 1 to 3.
10 Thus, while family background plays a non-negligible role in visual arts consumption, it is very far from being decisive, as Bourdieu suggests.
Model 2 includes the asymmetry parameter and thus allows the relative weights of origin and destination to differ between upwardly mobile and downwardly mobile individuals. Model 2 also fits the data well. But since models 1 and 2 are nested, their fit to the data can be compared formally using the likelihood ratio test. Table 4 shows that, compared to model 1, the deviance of model 2 is reduced by 2.88 for 2 degrees of freedom, which is not a statistically significant improvement in model fit (p = .23). Thus, there is also no evidence to support Hypothesis 3 or the asymmetry argument. 
Diagonal reference models with covariates
The results of our analyses so far fail to support any of the three versions of the social mobility argument. To investigate further, we add covariates to our diagonal reference models.
log π V rc
where x is a vector of covariates and β V is the corresponding vector of parameters. Descriptive statistics of the covariates can be found in Table 8 10 Model 1 can be reparameterised using P as the reference category. Regarding the odds of being an omnivore rather than a paucivore, w O v P = .317 (s.e. = .031). 11 Under model 2, the weight parameters for upwardly mobile people are w in the Appendix. Models 3 and 4 are the counterparts of models 1 and 2 respectively. The deviance (G 2 ) of model 3 is 33,599 and that of model 4 is 33,597, 12 giving a very modest difference of 2. Since the two models also differ by 2 degrees of freedom, we prefer the more parsimonious model 3 to model 4. So, again, there is no evidence in support of the asymmetry argument. Under model 3, w P = .301 (s.e. = .027) and w O = .358 (s.e. = .018). These estimates also strongly suggest the weight parameters are significantly different from 1. Thus, we also reject Hypothesis 1. Table 5 reports the parameter estimates under model 3. Let us start with the left-hand and central panels which show the P v I and the O v I contrasts respectively. As expected, compared with university graduates, people with intermediate or no qualifications are less likely to be paucivores (or omnivores) rather than inactives. The same is true for ethnic minorities, and people with children aged 0 to 4. But older people, people with children aged 5 to 11, those with higher income or of higher social status are more likely to consume visual arts. In addition, women are less likely than men to be omnivore rather than inactive.
We have also reparametrised model 3 using paucivores rather than inactives as the reference category, and the parameter estimates for the O v P contrast are reported in the right-hand panel of Table 5 . They are mostly comparable to those of the left-hand and central panels. But we also see that parents of children aged 5 to 11 are less likely to omnivores rather than paucivores, and income is no longer significant for the O v P contrast. Overall, these results are very similar to those reported by Chan and Goldthorpe (2007) .
To give a sense of the substantive magnitude of the various parameters, Figure 1 reports the predicted probabilities of latent class membership under model 3 for different sets of covariate values. Consider a 40-year-old white woman with an annual income of £20k. She is childless, and lives in London with a partner. Suppose that she is a second-generation university graduate and works as a Higher Professional (e.g. an accountant) which is at the top of the status scale of Chan and Goldthorpe (2004) . Under this scenario, the probability of her being an omnivore is 54%. But if she works as a Manager or Proprietor in Services (e.g. a hotel manager) which is of middling status, while all other covariates remain unchanged (scenario 2), then the probability of her being an omnivore stands at 43%. The difference between scenarios 1 and 2 gives us a sense of the magnitude of the status effect.
In scenarios 3 through 5, our hypothetical woman still works as a Manager or Proprietor in Services. But we vary her educational level and that of her parents. If both she and her parents have no qualifications (scenario 3), then the probability of her being an omnivore drops to just 5%. Clearly, the education effect is, in substantive terms, much larger than the status effect.
In scenario 4, our hypothetical woman achieves upward educational mobility. That is, her parents have no qualifications, but she is a university graduate. Under this scenario, the probability of her being an omnivore is 23%. In the case of downward mobility (i.e. she has no qualifications, but her parents are university graduates, scenario 5), then the probability is 13%. The important point to note here is that where our hypothetical woman is educationally mobile, either upward or downward, she is considerably less likely to be a visual arts omnivore than if she was a second-generation university graduate (compare scenarios 4 and 5 with scenario 2). Furthermore, although there are more paucivores among first generation graduates (scenario 4, 48%) than among second-generation graduates (scenario 2, 42%), the share of inactives is much higher among the former than among the latter (30% v 15%). Overall, the results of our diagonal reference model with covariates are inconsistent with the diverse exposure argument. 
Summary and discussion
Many scholars argue that social mobility plays a key role in the emergence of cultural omnivores. In this paper, we discuss three versions of the social mobility argument and show that none of them receives empirical support from recent survey data on visual arts consumption in the UK.
Specifically, visual arts consumption is very far from being determined by primary socialisation at parental home. Instead, the educational attainment of individuals carries about three times as much weight as their parents' education. This is inconsistent with the composition effect argument. Furthermore, this three-to-one ratio applies equally to both upwardly mobile and downwardly mobile individuals. This result goes against the asymmetry or status maximisation argument. Finally, socially mobile individuals, whether they move upwards or downwards, are less omnivorous than those who are intergenerationally stable in advantaged positions. In particular, first generation university graduates are less omnivorous than second generation graduates. This contradicts the diverse exposure argument.
Returning to our research question: where do cultural omnivores come from? In light of our findings, we have to say: not so much from social mobility as from a general democratisation of culture. Admittedly, the latter is an amorphous set of quite diverse arguments. However, as noted above, they all imply that cultural boundaries are weakening. This is not to deny that the distinctions of high-brow, middle-brow and low-brow cultures still exist. For example, most people would still regard opera but not street graffiti as high-brow culture. But there is a good deal of cultural crossover: some opera singers release pop albums, while the work of some graffiti artists is exhibited in art galleries and sold in auction houses at fantastic prices.
The blurring of cultural boundaries is mirrored by the declining significance of high culture as a status marker. Beckert (2001, p. 247) recounts the story of the founding of the Metropolitan Opera in the 1880s. After Vanderbilt, the railroad magnate, was snubbed by the then dominant New York Academy of Music, he and other industrialist-and financier-upstarts in New York founded the Metropolitan Opera and eventually drove the New York Academy out of business. If a private box in an opera house was the required statement of acceptance into 'society' of that era, it does not seem to be the case any more. The rich and powerful of today certainly still flaunt their wealth. But they do not have to do so through sponsoring high culture. Instead, owning a sports team or conspicious consumption of material luxury such as private jets or superyachts have become de rigueur (Frank, 1999) .
A Latent class analysis
Of the five types of visual arts events listed in Table 1 , most respondents would probably see items 1 and 2 as representing high-brow visual arts, with item 2 being perhaps relatively avant-garde. Items 3 and 4 refer to visual arts that are found 'on the street', including, say, sculptures of Henry Moore or Barbara Hepworth, but also street graffiti, and displays of ethnic masks and carvings, batik and embroideries, and other folk crafts in cultural festivals. Note: * In model 4, two residual local dependence terms are added between the indicators for 'street arts ' and 'carnival', and between 'video arts' and 'carnival'. We consider these two items as representing 'popular' forms of visual arts. Finally, item 5 is problematic as it lumps together museums and galleries. As Chan and Goldthorpe (2007, p. 173) observe, 'some museums-for example, natural history, industrial or local or regional museums-while no doubt displaying many objects of visual interest may not contain much in the way of "works of art" as usually understood.' For this reason, many respondents might see item 5 as representing visual arts of a middling kind. Table 6 reports the goodness of fit statistics of latent class models. None of the models achieves a satisfactory fit with the data by the conventional criterion of 5% type I error. But given the large number of observations in the contingency table (N = 28, 657), we accept model 4 as providing an adequate summary of the data. Table 7 reports the latent class solution under model 4. It can be seen that members of the largest latent class, which accounts for 58% of the respondents, are quite inactive in the visual arts. Over a twelve months period, only one in nine (11%) had been to a museum or gallery; and one in twelve (8%) had been to a carnival. The participation rates at other visual arts events are even lower at 3% or less.
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In contrast, although the smallest latent class accounts for only 13% of the sample, its members are keen consumers of the visual arts across the board. Almost all of them had visited a museum or galley (95%), or an exhibition of art, photography or sculpture (97%); more than a third (38%) had visited a video or electronic arts event; and even for street arts and carnival their participation rate is still the highest of all. Finally, there is a third group that is intermediate both in terms of its size (29% of the sample) and the level of visual arts consumption of its members. 
